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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
58-1-16,1953 Utah Code, as amended:
Notice of disciplinary action - Hearing officers - Director's powers - Evidence
(1) ...
(2)

(a) All adjudicative proceedings shall be held before an appropriate

presiding officer, as designated by the director.
(b) The presiding officer shall make written recommendations for action,
findings of fact, and conclusions of law.
(c) The director, with the concurrence of the appropriate board, may issue
a written order based on the recommendations but is not bound to follow the
recommendations of the presiding officer.

(d) If the director does not issue an order within ten days after the
presiding officer has made the recommendations, the recommendations of the presiding
officer shall become the order.
THE COURSE OF PROCEEDING BELOW
Hearing in the matter of the license of Carl W. Barney to practice as a health facility
administrator in the State of Utah, case number, OPL-91-69, came before the Division of
Occupational and Professional Licensing with J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge with
the Department of Commerce, as presiding officer by designation of David E. Robinson,
Director, Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing. Also, administrative review of
the proceedings was had before the Department of Commerce Executive Director C. B. White,
oral argument being denied.
At the hearing the Division was represented by Cy H. Castle, Assistant Attorney General,
State of Utah. The petitioner was present and represented through counsel, Dale E. Stratford.
Five members of the Health Facility Administrators Board were present: the Chair of the board,
Sue Bowker, Joyce Hailing, Terry Lemmon, Barbara Adams and Joseph Anderson were also
present. And the director of the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, David E.
Robinson, was also present sitting with the Board.
Director Robinson used an inquisitorial manner to examine most of the witnesses at the
hearing into all aspects of the operation of a health care facility. This included nursing services,
rates of occupancy, consultants, medical directors, staffing levels, break even points and
profitability. (Transcript at pp. 944-945).
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These are matters regularly surveyed for and better left to the regulation of the
Department of Finance (p. 945).
Inflammatory and wildly prejudicial allegations like drugging patents through the halls,
practicing medicine, unlawful detention and unlawful restraints being used were all presented
and not proved. (Record at pp. 87-96).
In the end the facts found were these:
The petitioner had physically abused and/or used excessive force by
failing to seek extra help to control psychiatric residents in four instances.
The petitioner had administered medication to an unidentified (probably
non existent) patient in one instance.
The petitioner had spilled medication by negligently tipping over a cart
with no damage to anyone.
See: Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law and Recommended Order, (at pp.
87-96).
Constant repetition of unproved allegations has magnified matters beyond reason.
SUMMARY OF REPLY
Courts will hold administrative agencies to an observance of the elementary basics of due
process of law.
Fundamental due process is not easily waived where orderly procedures prove ineffective
and even risky for one who would object to plain error.
The petitioner did not fail to preserve objections by not performing timely acts that would
have been useless.
The Division fashions for itself a kind of retributory role designed to punish people where
other agencies have not done so.
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Harmless error analysis is not appropriate where structural error is pervasive and goes
beyond ordinary hearing errors.
REPLY ARGUMENT
POINT I
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AGENCY ACTION OR THE STATUTE OR RULE ON
WHICH IT IS BASED OR AS APPLIED IS SUBJECT TO APPELLATE REVIEW
The due process of law requirement for the conduct of agency action consists of more
than conclusionary statements and innuendoes not fitting within a specific basis for judicial
review under Section 63-46b-16 (4) as claimed in Respondent's brief. (Pg. 13.)
It has been recognized by the Utah Supreme Court to be a clear violation of state due
process where one in the position of the director of the division of the department involved
herein would investigate, prosecute, and then participate as a judge in the adjudication of a case.
Petitioner's brief and the record herein is clear in that Director Robinson had investigated the case
in various stages, that he presented a substantial part of the allegations at the hearing, that he sat
with the board hearing the case, that he appointed a presiding officer in the form of an
administrative law judge assigned to the Department of Commerce to hear the case, and that he
had adjudicated the case on the recommendation of a board influenced with his presence,
comments and directions throughout the hearing. Sheer numbers of bodies can hardly disguise or
lessen the role played by Mr. Robinson. See: In Re McCune, 111 P.2d. 701 (Utah -1986) at p.
706.
The Utah Administrative Procedure Act 63-46b-1 et. al. permits the court to grant relief if
it determines that the petitioner has been substantially prejudiced by an agency action which is
unconstitutional or based on a statute or rule which is unconstitutional. Questar Pipeline v. Tax
-4-

Commission, 817 P.2d. 316, (Utah 1991). at p. 317. Agency determinations of constitutional
provisions are to be reviewed under a correction of error standard, giving no deference to the
agency's decision.
POINT II
THE PARTICIPATION OF PETITIONER AT THE HEARING UNDER
THE GROUND RULES AND POLICY OF THE DIVISION DID NOT
WAIVE PETITIONERS EXPECTATION OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW
At p. 19, note 7, of the respondent's brief, it is noted (p. 20) that the Division has now
adopted a policy that the Division Director will not participate in any hearing which has been
delegated to a Board with the assistance of an administrative law judge. This "new" policy was
instigated upon the concerns of this court expressed in Pickett v. Department of Commerce, 858
P.2d. 187, (Utah App. -1993). However, the Division's "new" policy of due process comes too
late for the petitioner herein, because the hearing predated the Division's present concern for
fairness. (Respondent's brief, f.n. p. 20).
Contrary to the position of the respondent, the petitioner did not waive any right to due
process under the structures expressed in Pickett (Supra.). The administrative law judge, on the
transcript in the record of the hearing, at p. 822, states:
"The record should reflect (emphasis added) that during those recesses,
most of which occurred off the record with counsel for both parties' concerns were
raised with the court by counsel for respondent as to certain conduct of Mr.
Robinson. And it was to him that any of those concerns and also any of those
instructions were directed, although they were generally worded to include
members of the Board and perhaps on one occasion even counselforboth
parties."
and again, at p. 823:
"The record should also reflect (emphasis added) that counsel for
respondent had some hesitancy in directly raising any objections during the
hearing as to the conduct of Mr. Robinson, for appropriate reasons that can be left
unsaid.
-5-

The administrative law judge further remarked:
..."I have, in many other cases, had occasion to observe Mr. Robinson in a
role similar to that which he has played in this case."
What sort of other objection would have carried any weight at the hearing is hard to
understand. Even after the in-camera exchange described here, Mr. Robinson was allowed to
continue at the hearing in presenting his own investigation and questioning of the petitioner at
cross-examination, and with no further admonitions from the judge. (Transcript at pp. 944 - 945).
The "...appropriate reasons that can be left unsaid" says it all. Justice must appear to do
justice.
POINT III
FAILURE TO ACCORD DUE PROCESS OF LAW IS PLAIN
ERROR AND WILL CONSTITUTE SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICE
UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT
Respondent contends that the petitioner must necessarily have made his objections as to
hearing error promptly and to have sought redress for each error in the progression of the
proceedings. See: Onyeabor v. Pro Roofing, Inc., 787 P.2d. 525 (Ut. App. -1990); State v.
Cabututan, 861 P.2d. 408, (Utah -1993). Otherwise, the objections raised on the record with the
administrative law judge should not be considered on appeal.
InD. B. v. Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, 779 P.2d. 1145, (Ut.
App. -1989), states that as a general rule, objections or questions which have not been raised or
urged in the proceedings before the administrative agency will not be considered by the court on
review of the order of the agency. However, "we are not precluded from reversing in a case of
plain error such as this." (at p. 1148).
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Still, questions and objections were raised with the administrative law judge who had
been designated as the presiding officer for the hearing, and throughout the hearing although not
necessarily directly raised "for appropriate reasons that can be left unsaid." (Transcript at p. 823).
The judge explains that he would then give cautionary instructions "in a general sense" to apply
to Mr. Robinson (Transcript at p. 822).
Structural defects like thefreeranging conduct of Mr. Robinson at the hearing do not
lend themselves to harmless error analysis. The entire conduct of the hearingfrombeginning to
end is obviously affected by the presence of the director who is not impartial and who is
co-officiating. Constitutional deprivations as to the structure of the hearing affect theframework
within which the inquiry proceeds. Without basic protections the hearing cannot reliably serve
its function to regulate the course of the hearing to obtain full disclosure of relevant facts and to
afford parties reasonable opportunity to present their position. See: Arizona v. Fulminate, 499
U.S. 279; 111 S.Ct. 1246; 113 L.Ed. 2d. 302 (1990) at pp. 309-310; D.B. v. Division of
Occupational and Professional Licensing, Supra., at pp. 1147-1149.
The conclusion of the D.B. Court was that D.B.'s hearing "lacked the due process required
by law, was unfair, and constitutes "substantial prejudice" to him." So it is with the petitioner
herein.
POINT IV
PRINCIPLES OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY PROTECTION,
LIKE DUE PROCESS, DO APPLY TO AGENCY ACTION
"There is a double jeopardy clause in the United States Constitution, Amendment V, in
the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12, and in the Code of Criminal Procedure, U.C.A.,
1953, Title 77-1-6 (2) (a). The double jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment is a guarantee
-7-

so fundament to American criminal justice that it has been held binding on the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment." McNair v. Hayward, 666 P.2d. 321 (Utah -1993). at p. 323.
Petitioner has asserted that the double jeopardy clause of the federal constitution forbids a second
hearing for the purpose of affording the State of Utah another opportunity to supply evidence
which it failed to muster in a first attempt to convict Carl Barney of assault on Peggy Anderson.
This is central to the objective of the prohibition against successive trials and repeated attempts
to convict an individual for an alleged offense.
Unlike under the Utah criminal references, the question under the Fifth Amendment is not
one of how the State categorizes the proceeding: criminal, civil, or special. The question is not
whether it is civil or criminal, but rather whether it is punishment for some offense. Under
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435; 109 S.Ct. 1892; 104 L.Ed. 2d. 487; (1989) at p. 448, the
question is whether forfeiture serves in part to punish, and one need not excuse the possibility
that forfeiture serves other purposes to reach that conclusion.
Grounds for the revocation of the petitionees license by the Division is found in Title
58-1-15, U.C.A., 1953, as amended. The division may suspend or revoke the license of any
licensee who is or has been guilty of unprofessional conduct as defined. Moreover, in the same
statute, it may suspend or revoke the license of one who has been convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude which, when considered with the functions and duties of the occupation or
profession for which the license was issued, demonstrates a threat to the public health, safety,
and welfare. A fair reading of the words of the statute establish that suspension or revocation of
licenses issued by the division serves in part as punishment for the conviction of crime. That is
how the statute has been applied by the Division, and that is how the revocation of the
-8-

petitioner's license has been used here, even though he has never been convicted of any crime
charged by the Division.
The punishment is clear and was clearly called for in the prosecution's argument at the
close of the hearing: "...we believe that it's appropriate for you as a board to punish Mr. Barney
for his conduct." (Transcript at p. 973.), "...his conduct deserves punishment..." (Transcript
at p. 1002).
The inclusion in the notice of agency action of conduct for which Mr. Barney had been
acquitted at trial in a Utah Court of Law, and his successive trial for that conduct constitutes
structural error designed to assure the full weight of punishment be meted out to Mr. Barney.
That inclusion was sufficient to assure that full punishment was imposed for that conduct.
Evocation may not have been had on other charges alone. The result is that the petitioner is
made to suffer substantial prejudice within the meaning of that phrase in Savage Industries v.
State Tax Commission, 811 P.2d. 664, (Utah -1991), at p. 669.
POINT V
REFUSAL TO HEAR WITNESSES FAVORABLE TO THE PETITIONER
BECAUSE TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE WAS NOT HARMLESS ERROR
The presiding officer shall regulate the course of the hearing to obtain full disclosure of
relevant facts and to afford all the parties reasonable opportunity to present their position. The
administrative law judge had a statutory duty to obtain full disclosure of the facts. The course he
took was unfair to the petitioner and the agency failed to follow prescribed procedure. D.B. v.
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, Supra., at pp. 1147-1148.
The issue in the D.B. case was a failure to allow cross-examination of agency witnesses,
which was clearly manifest error. The difference between no cross examination and of not
-9-

hearing witnesses at all because the court has run out of time is not apparent to the party trying to
make his case.
The respondent claims some wiggle room by reciting discretion in the presiding officer to
exclude evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious either on his own motion or
upon objection of a party. See: Title 63-46b-8 (1) (b) (i). Here he just flat out refuses to hear
witnesses.
The reason for that is clear, and it has nothing to do with discretion:
Had we the luxury of time that would allow this proceeding to run to an
ultimate conclusion regardless of its length attempts would be made to obtain
those exhibits and make them part of this record subject to any questions. We do
not have that luxury. (Transcript at p. 797, Eklund).
Mr. Stratford I know you have indicated that you had perhaps six or seven
additional witnesses beyond Mr. Barney who would testify later today. Frankly I
don't think we have the time to take them. (Transcript at p. 797, Eklund).
...I'm not suggesting your requests were inappropriate at all. We simply
do not have the time and resources to accommodate those requests. (Transcript
at p. 800, Eklund).
Unfortunately, under the circumstances we're dealing with - the time
constraints we have...we will commence testimony from Mr. Barney and carry
this hearing to it's conclusion and finish it no later than 6:00 p.m. today.
(Transcript at p. 826, Eklund).
I recognize we are operating with a lay board and that that Board, at least
one member of that Board, has indicated a desire that by 6:00 he's gone. And I
recognize that the Court may hold the Board beyond that time, but I don't know
that that's effective. Knowing his time schedule, knowing his timeframe,I'm not
sure that he would be willing to consider and discuss the matter. (Transcript at
p. 815, Stratford).
This is not what the statute about irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious evidence
provides for.
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If time had gotten away, the most obvious reason is the heavy presence of Mr. Robinson
sitting with the Board. The director's powers were to designate a presiding officer, and with the
concurrence of an appropriate board to perhaps issue a written order based on recommendations.
58-1-16,1953 U.C.A. Director Robinson did issue his order, based on who knows what, but
Mr. Barney had been deprived of important defense witnesses by substantial interference on the
part of the division director.
Substantial allegations against Mr. Barney were not alleged in particularity as to time and
place. Defense witnesses could testify that division witnesses were either not employed or
unable to be where they said they were to see what they said they saw. Witnesses had discussed
the events and developed various inconsistent versions of their recollections. One prospective
defense witness had even been approached to give testimony in support of those various
recollections.
However, the one potential witness with the greatest knowledge of the psychiatric care
plans was not allowed to testify. (Transcript, pp. 808-809).
The D.B. court faced with the apparentcy of established "unprofessional conduct" could
say that while the record may constitute a basis upon which the Division could justify revocation,
...we believe that such should be permitted only in proceedings where the
Division itself affords a fair hearing under due process as mandated and required
by law. (Transcript at p. 1148).
The court is not precluded from reversing in a case of plain error. D.B. v. Division of
Occupational and Professional Licensing, Supra. To apply a doctrine of harmless error to such a
case is not justified.
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CONCLUSION
The function of judicial review of the orders of administrative agencies is limited to
assuring the legality of, and compliance with, the process that the law has established to regulate
affairs in the public interest. It is not the function of a court to judge the professional
qualifications or practices being regulated.
Petitioner asks that the Court grant relief from an order of the agency by determining that
the petitioner has been substantially prejudiced by unconstitutional agency action, that due
process of law was not satisfied, and that the action has been arbitrary or capricious.
The petitioner herein asks that Court for total relieffromthe order of the Department of
Commerce dated on November 10,1993, revoking the petitioner's license to act as a Health
Facility Administrator.
DATED this

day of

, 1994.
Respectfully Submitted.

DALE E. STRATFORD
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant,
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